Kantar have published a new voting intention poll ahead of the budget, the first I’ve seen from them since the general election. Topline figures are CON 42%, LAB 38%, LDEM 9%, UKIP 5%. Fieldwork was between last Tuesday and this Monday.

This is the first poll to show a Conservative lead since September and the largest Tory lead in any poll since the election. As ever, it’s best to look carefully at any poll that shows an unusual result before getting too excited/dismayed. The reason for the unusual result appears to be methodological, rather than from some sudden Tory recovery, and down to the way Kantar treat turnout. As regular readers will know, many polls came horribly unstuck at the 2017 election because instead of basing turnout on how likely respondents said they were to vote, they predicted respondents likelihood to vote based on factors like their age and class. These methods assumed young people would be much less likely to vote, and produced large Conservative leads that ended up being wrong. Generally speaking, these socio-economic models have been dropped.

At the election Kantar took a sort of halfway position – they based their turnout model on both respondents’ self-assessed likelihood to vote, whether they voted last time and their age, assuming that older people were more likely to vote than younger people. This actually performed far better than most other companies did; Kantar’s final poll showed a five point Conservative lead, compared to the 2.5 they actually got. As such, Kantar appear to have kept using their old turnout model that partly predicts likelihood to vote based on age. The impact of this is clear – before turnout weighting Labour would have had a one point lead, very similar to other companies’ polls. After turnout weighting the Conservatives are four points ahead (the full tabs and methodology details are here).

(Another noticable difference between Kantar’s method and other companies is that they use the leaders’ names in their voting intention question, though given there is not nearly as much of a gap between Theresa May and Jeremy Corbyn’s ratings as there used to be I’m not sure that would still have an impact.)


633 Responses to “Kantar- CON 42, LAB 38, LDEM 9, UKIP 5”

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  1. S Thomas

    Your right! I let the cat out of the bag the budget strategy was clearly for the UK economy to actually do better than forecast from each year from now on.

  2. Alec

    So no comment on the article in the Independant, just a rather poor attempt at a joke.

    You perhaps see why I don’t bother to research for people with closed minds even why i have the time.

  3. S Thomas

    Sorry …for each year……..

  4. Alec

    ………even when i have the time.

  5. COLIN
    it’s a tad unfortunate that the president doing the leaning is himself from the SPD. Perhaps, unlike Shulze, he’d like to see his party back inside the government. Who knows, but either way, voting is pretty pointless and Germany will continue to be (well) run by the same, faceless technocrats.

  6. DAVID COLBY

    I didn’t realise that until this evening. Yes-it adds a certain something to the conversation.

    So after some weeks of trying to lean further to the right-she will now have to lean to the left.

    I see that Shuz wants is members to havce the say so.

    That will be interesting.

  7. COLIN
    Perhaps the fact that these months of horsetrading are seen as fairly normal goes some way to explain how accepting Germans generally are to the flaws that Brits find in virtually every corridor in Brussels. Perhaps it’s a case of ‘It works out in the end in Germany, so what’s the problem?’
    It’s not ideal though, to vote repeatedly for your team and end up with both main parties divvying things out in secret. The system worked when there were just three blocks although FDP had WAY to much power, but now that it’s more fragmented it’s a bit of a mess.

  8. “But it is increasingly clear that the additional, and dramatic, new element is not local, but the enormous stress being put on the British-Irish framework underpinning the Good Friday system as a result of Brexit.”

    http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/11/24/brexit-has-blown-open-the-unreconciled-divisions-in-northern-ireland/

  9. s thomas: ROI – some people might be forgiven for thinking that no hard border exits between ROI and NI. But it does. there is a hard tax border,a hard vat border,a hard health border. The only soft border is people and goods.People are not an issue so it is goods only.

    so people are saying the tax,vat health border can remain where it is at present namely at the 310 mile the land border, the people border can remain where it is so the only issue is not where the hard border should be generally but where it should be for one aspect of it,namely goods.

    Not a deal breaker i would suggest.

    Really? The whole leave campaign was about ‘taking back control’ of borders specifically. And it was taking back control because of people [from outside the EU specifically].

    So, OK, you say that the people border can stay where it is. But unless the people running the leave campaign were total g0bsh!tes, the nature of the people border has to change substantially in order to take back ‘control’.

    Now the thing that is required is to establish where that people border should go, in admission that the nature of the people border is changed because of the need to take back control. Don’t forget that it was the ‘clear democratic will of the people’ to take back control and change the nature of the people border.

  10. sam: “But it is increasingly clear that the additional, and dramatic, new element is not local, but the enormous stress being put on the British-Irish framework underpinning the Good Friday system as a result of Brexit.”

    http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/11/24/brexit-has-blown-open-the-unreconciled-divisions-in-northern-ireland/

    Another interesting find. Going forward from the time of the GFA, it looked to be a semi-permanent solution. But looking on it now, it seems to have been achieved by the Nationalists accepting it as a short to medium term temporary arrangement and the Unionists accepting it as a medium to long term permanence.

    Again, I say, it looks like the present situation is taking us outside what the GFA can or should accommodate. Although it was intended by neither the DUP or brexites generally, it seems to me that the referendum result was effectively a vote to cut NI adrift from the UK and that the DUP campaign for brexit was an unreasonable imposition on the tolerance of the rest of the UK.

  11. @TCO

    You’re making a mountain out of a molehill there.

    It’s an issue, but as most Irish imports and exports go via Channel and then Irish Sea, we all need to get real.

    Bar some sort of “Berlin Airlift” via Cherbourg, there will be compromise.

  12. @jonesinbangor

    Why would there be need to be a “Berlin Airlift”? Transit goods are covered by the TIR system.

  13. @Hireton

    I know about TIR, but if the EU insist on some protracted customs checks, are they plannig on exempting RoI traffic?

  14. For the life of me, I can’t see why the Irish border is such a problem, certainly not from the UK side. If Ireland was an easy entry point to the UK it would be used now and there would have been no camps at Calais. Ireland, not being in Schengen, has border controls at its ports and airports. They have no reason to relax them. The Irish can travel to the UK when they want but other EU nationals would be unlikely to want to risk using this route illegally. Similarly, UK nationals won’t be sneaking into the rest of Europe that way. Goods can travel on a TIR and the collection of any duties need not be terribly complicated.

    Of course, it is easy to think up terrible complications that simply won’t exist in practice. This is just a question of goodwill being required on both sides. Causing unnecessary difficulties is definitely not in Ireland’s interest.

  15. @TOH – “So no comment on the article in the Independant, just a rather poor attempt at a joke.”

    As you know, I usually do try and respond when someone brings forward some evidence – unlike you, it has to be said, and here I think you are asking others to do things you can’t be bothered to do, which is a little two faced, I would suggest.

    As it happens, like you, I am pushed for time at present. The research @Colin picked up sounds interesting, and if I can find the time over the weekend I will have a look at this, but there is the rugby and possibly the garden to attend to, along with my day job.

  16. jonesinbangor: @TCO – You’re making a mountain out of a molehill there.

    It’s an issue, but as most Irish imports and exports go via Channel and then Irish Sea, we all need to get real.

    Bar some sort of “Berlin Airlift” via Cherbourg, there will be compromise.

    A strange response to a comment on the ‘people border’ as mentioned by St Homas

  17. technicolouroctober

    The description of the border by St Homas seems even more outlandish than most of her observations when you consider that there is a “health” border as well as a border in every other aspect of the sovereignty exercised by every EU state in such subsidiary matters.

    Indeed, they exist within states as well. The UK is rather a good example (though there are many others as well). .

    That she chooses to live in a part of the England that has a less efficient NHS (though better health due to greater wealth) may reinforce the view that “her heid zips up the back” as many of her countrywomen are wont to remark.

  18. Canada – maybe Korea – not so deep or special. Hard borders. It seems Mrs May and adviser N Timothy alone made decision to leave SM and CU

    https://www.politico.eu/article/trade-canada-flexible/

  19. SAM

    It’s been pretty obvious right from the start that the EU held all the cards. Johnson’s foolish have cake and eat it comment sums up the amateurish way this Govt has conducted negotiations. We will be worse off by March 2019. For the majority of leavers that’s a price worth paying but there will be a significant tranche who voted Leave who may well change their minds in the coming months.

    The Test match remains finely balanced but England have let Aus off the hook. We need to set them at least 200 to win. If we can eke out a lead of 250 it’s game on

  20. @ SAM

    “Duff deal and bluff called.”

    I view it as the UKs technocratic elite still being very bitter about losing their Brussels gravy train.

    The reality for the average UK citizen will little perceptible change post Brexit.

  21. The news this morning that the Australians are not happy with the way the E.U. and the UK want to divide their WTO quotas demonstrates the oft repeated mantra that we can just fall back on WTO terms will not be as easy as some think. If Australia, our ally think that, what on earth will be the reaction of those countries not so friendly to us.

  22. Mike Pearce

    And what would have been the professional way to conduct these negotiations? It is easy to say that they have been amateur but given the circumstances what could have been different.

  23. S THOMAS

    Pronouncements like those of Johnson and Hammond for a start. They were bound to rile the EU. In addition this Govt were not prepared for a Brexit vote. They didn’t have a scoobie what to do after the Referendum. They should have been prepared for that eventuality.
    Didn’t Fox say it would be easy to leave the EU?

    There had also been no thought about how this would impact upon Northern Ireland and Eire either. The Govt should have been more open with the electorate post Brexit and tempered expectations. There is only so far you can go with waving the Union Jack.

  24. Alec

    Good to see you enjoy Rugby and gardening.

  25. @s.thomas
    Going to Euro 2019 with a team captained by Phil Neville with Vinnie Jones and Gazza as Biel lieutenants was never likely to end well

  26. Jonesinbangor

    “The reality for the average UK citizen will little perceptible change post Brexit.”

    I am sorry but you are deluded and wrong.

    Practically every independent body predicts that Brexit will have an adverse effect on our economy in the short to more medium term. Even TOH admits to accepting that – it’s his price he’s willing to pay for what he believes will bring increased sovereignty.

    This will extend the years of austerity and the resulting hit on services will hit the poorest and most vulnerable the most. Many of those who sadly voted for Brexit.

  27. st homas: And what would have been the professional way to conduct these negotiations? It is easy to say that they have been amateur but given the circumstances what could have been different.

    1] Pre ‘circumstance’, avoid the need to negotiate
    2] Pre ‘circumstance’ not hold a referendum until the leave side had a credible plan
    3] Not trigger Article 50 until there was a credible plan
    4] Listen to the EU pre Art 50 and reflect how the 3 areas would play [EU citizens, NI, divorce payment] and war game them to death eg on NI have teams representing NI, DUP, SF, ROI, EU
    5] Have a realistic end point agreed within the UK and have the JRM faction signed up as well as the tory party as a whole
    6] Not try negotiating anything on which there is no internal consensus
    7] Not make it up as you go along according to what you think you can get away with
    8] Elevate strategy above tactics
    9] Accept that it is an open negotiation and be open with the country
    10] Do proper validated impact assessments and publish them

    Actually, 5, 6 and 7 show that it was foolish ever to trigger art 50

  28. @ S Thomas, Mike Pearce et al
    In respect of UK negotiating approach I am reminded of Macbeth
    “It is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.”

  29. @ TONYBTG
    “I am sorry but you are deluded and wrong.
    Practically every independent body predicts that Brexit will have an adverse effect on our economy in the short to more medium term. Even TOH admits to accepting that – it’s his price he’s willing to pay for what he believes will bring increased sovereignty.
    This will extend the years of austerity and the resulting hit on services will hit the poorest and most vulnerable the most. Many of those who sadly voted for Brexit.”

    I have a different outlook on this to you, I suppose we all have “delusions” on that basis.

    I accept that there will be short term pain, yes, of course, if only to meet the costs of the new reality.

    The great majority of austerity related issues in Britain have nothing to do with the EU and staying / leaving is inconsequential. Having an inefficient tax system that doesn’t effectively and appropriately target wealth is our biggest issue, and I don’t see the Tories doing much about that.

    At least Brexit got rid of the austerity front man and malevolent side kick running the UK.

  30. TonyBTG

    “it’s his price he’s willing to pay for what he believes will bring increased sovereignty.”

    You forgot that economically I think the UK will be much better ioff in the medium to long term. Hence my confidence in reviewing in 2030.

    I agree about the short term effect.

  31. TECHNICOLOUROCTOBER

    Excellent post re what should have been done.

    The only thing I would have added is that a second question could have been added in the event of leave winning, as was done in the referendum, asking whether to remain in the EEA or to rely on WTO terms of trade.

    Had the 2016 referendum included that, the EEA option would have won comfortably given that some leave campaigners recommended it and virtually all remainers would have recognised it as a reasonable compromise.

    If, as seems quite likely, we do have an EUref2, that should be the approach.

  32. TOH

    “You forgot that economically I think the UK will be much better ioff in the medium to long term. Hence my confidence in reviewing in 2030.”

    On what basis do you expect things to be better, or at the very least be starting to look better, by 2030.

    That may be what you think, is there any evidence to back up your expectation? Any independent think tanks or professional bodies supporting this view? Please share with us the basis for your viewpoint.

    2030 you think… well that is 11 years post Brexit of slower economy, poor funding of schools, vulnerable people suffering and more holes in the high street,

    Of course, I accept that this might have happened anyway even without Brexit. But Brexit will practically guarantee nothing improves tangibly for the poorest in our society for many more years.

    A price worth paying you say… how very selfish selfish of you. I bet you won’t suffer that much.

  33. TECHNICOLOUROCTOBER

    I forgot to prefix my 1st mention of referendum.

    Meant the Scottish Parliament referendum.

  34. Barbazenzero: I forgot to prefix my 1st mention of referendum.

    Meant the Scottish Parliament referendum.

    Reminds me of the Scottish Independence prospectus, “Scotland’s future”

    http://www.gov.scot/resource/0043/00439021.pdf [warning, 670 pages]

    This is another thing which should have been done, the government publishing for EU membership and Leave being made to publish similar as a condition of holding the referendum. Of course, Leave could never have produced one with a single model of post EU existence ….

  35. @TOH – I’ve had a quick look at the article on Irish productivity measurements. Some thoughts:

    It’s an opinion piece, and I’m struggling to locate the actual Irish study quoted. The article says that this was expressly about the Irish high tech sector, but then says that if this method was applied to the UK it would add 5% to GDP in effect. It doesn’t say whether the author applied this to the whole of UK GDP to get the 5% uplift, or whether they applied it only to the high tech sector (which is what the measure was designed for) to get the additional £100bn of growth.
    If the latter, which would be the correct way of applying the Irish research to the UK, then the proportionate uplift to the high tech sector productivity could be huge. (If the HT sector comprises say 25% of the entire UK economy, the productivity gain in this part of the economy would need to the 20% to reach the headline 5% figure). That feels wrong to me.

    My guess (and this is only a guess at this stage) is that there may have been a bit of sloppy journalism here, although to be fair, they do warn that the findings are only provisional and need to be treated with care.Apart from that, it’s very hard to comment without site of the source report.

    One thing that did make me smile though was reading the comments after the article. Someone was talking about the iPhone as the great communications innovation of the last decade or so, and waxed lyrical about how it enabled them to attend meetings around the world and keep on top of their schedule. This is no doubt true, but there is abundant research that shows that the more meetings organisations have, the less efficient they tend to be, and we all know how emails have become a huge source of stagnation in the workplace as managing the communications methodology ends up becoming a task in itself, to the exclusion of what actually needs to be done.

    Certainly on the communications side, I can well imagine the efficiency gains brought about by high tech innovations also brings significant additional burdens, but the picture will vary from sector to sector.

  36. @ CMJ – thank you for the historic info. Some would call Black Wednesday, White Wednesday but clearly at the time it was viewed as ‘bad’ and hence a big hit to Major. One would hope CON know the lessons of both how to handle the crisis and how to politically contain the situation – although I have low confidence in that!
    With Scotland being a large chunk of seats then a hung parliament is certainly the most likely. My model is broken at the moment so I’m going from memory but with a huge list of caveats I see the clean majority %s as

    CON 4% lead over LAB
    LAB 8% lead over CON

    (main caveats being Scotland is unchanged, no resurgence of either LDEM or UKIP, no change in tactical voting and 2017 demographic turnout)

    So around a 12% range around a hung parliament and we’re currently polling about bang in the middle at equal seats.

    The type of hung parliament is then a factor and CON only have one ‘friend’ although I doubt LAB’s ‘friends’ will be as accommodating as LDEM were for DC+GO!

  37. TRQs back in the news (as NEILJ picked up). We’ve been through this before but help request in case I have it wrong (HIRETON?)

    Options:
    1/ Give up. Beg to revoke A50 and hope EU are nice to us on the way back.

    2/ Continue as we are. 3rd countries are clearly miffed, as they should be, and EU are very protective so they aren’t going to budge either. This looks like a recipe for ending up in the zombie land of EEA+CU forever, paying 60bn for the pleasure!

    3/ Reset talks asap. Talks with EU move to a ‘min.deal’ up approach and talks with 3rd countries start UK bilateral prelims. Suggested approach is take max UK import quota for last 10years, add 10% and agree that as temporary (5y) new TRQ for UK only side – that is a generous offer to ANZAC, Brazil, US, etc. EU can sort themselves out with default being they take the full TRQ with no UK element – the EU will not like that one bit and hence it is a master card to play before we cave in on everything else.

    4/ Minford plan!

    1+2 are political suicide for CON but possible escape if they are forced to hold a new ref via deadlock in HoC. Technically very easy as problem goes away.

    3. is IMHO the glaringly obvious choice! Politically dumps the EU in the poop, would work well with old/new friends without overly restricting future trade deals. Quite time consuming so let’s get on with it.

    4. IMHO this is the default with CON+DUP weak govt and I don’t like it. Minford’s plan is very simple but it would be a brutal shock to UK economy and although I’d like lower tariffs etc going from current regime to total unilateral free trade on 30Mar19 seems very, very risky and I doubt CON would survive it which would probably mean LAB reverse it – so foolish to try it.

    HIRETON, NORBOLD, others – any view on #3?

  38. @ TO – your reply to S THOMAS

    Within the 5y govt cycle that is obviously a limiting factor your 1-4 rewrite as:

    1-4: Trigger A50 and gain enough lead to hold a GE for a new 5yr mandate
    5: Win the GE with enough of a majority to ignore the JRM faction and/or bring other parties (LAB) in to negotiations
    6: Make the necessary compromises, pay a fair divorce bill, have the 2y main transition with some elements running longer, tackle the domestic issues to boost domestic production, open up trade talks with old/new partners.

    5 went wrong so new plan (not what i want but the only way I can see CON surviving)

    5: Mess up the GE and end up reliant on DUP
    6: Play along for a while upping the offer to the absolute limit of the JRM factions tolerance fully expecting the EU to demand more
    7: Once declined again in Dec, do a full on ‘spit the dummy’ final take it or leave it offer (I’d prefer this now or even back in Oct but I expect it will be in Jan)
    8a: EU accept the offer – move to 6 above
    8b: EU refuse the offer (more likely) – move to min.deal up approach and kick-start the implementation, be prepared to move back to 8a but not at the terms offered (ie have enough backbone to see the bluff through)

    I don’t think May will do #7 but if she doesn’t then I expect we’ll have a leadership election to replace her. The 3bn from Hammond and the silence of Boris+Gove give me some cautious optimism May will deliver our own ultimatum but probability wise 50%ish?

  39. TECHNICOLOUROCTOBER

    Agreed that the leave campaign should have been required to produce a prospectus on the lines you suggest.

    HMG did produce a paper on the leave options available here in early March 2016, which didn’t receive any publicity at the time, but could have been the basis for any options which the leave campaign thought relevant.

    Prominent Leavers were pretty fond of the Norway option during the campaign, and it certainly should have been an option considered, if only as a first stepping stone. Given the closeness of the result plus NI border issues it’s probably the only option which could bring some normality back into the UK polity.

  40. The most significant problem with the UK/EU negotiations is that they are being carried out by a government which represents a minority of the electorate but – far, far worse – they are hamstrung by an even smaller minority of their own party and the right wing media.

    The reason May called an election was to get around that problem; she managed to make it even worse.

  41. TonyBG

    Too busy, sorry you will have to wait until 2030 when we can discuss actualities.

    Alec

    Thanks for replying.

    If you are busy you should not have bothered to reply as that is a perfectly reasonable reason, as is cannot be bothered IMO, something i do all the time as you rightly point out. This is just a blog, nothing of consequence. I am happy that the Irish work is of at least interest, it shows you mind is not closed which is good.

  42. TREVOR WARNE

    Why are you so anti the Norway option?

    That would be enough to allow the EU to fudge the Irish border issue, take the UK out of the CAP & CFP and allow Fox to seek all the external trade deals he needs. It would also mean only a 12-month A127 delay if a future referendum decides to go full fat WTO.

    Being the leastworst option to remainers, it would almost certainly win hands down if put to another referendum without further tarnishing the Con brand. Offering it to the current HoC as a “free” vote would almost certainly succeed, with rather less danger of Lab* becoming HMG in the short term, which I thought from your previous posts was one of your key priorities.

    * Re the 8% lead you suggest Lab would need for a majority, I agree, but although SNP wouldn’t go into coalition with them, I’d be astonished if they wouldn’t agree a C&S arrangement.

    Off out now, but back tonight.

  43. Barbazenzero: TECHNICOLOUROCTOBER – Agreed that the leave campaign should have been required to produce a prospectus on the lines you suggest.

    HMG did produce a paper on the leave options available here in early March 2016, which didn’t receive any publicity at the time, but could have been the basis for any options which the leave campaign thought relevant.

    Prominent Leavers were pretty fond of the Norway option during the campaign, and it certainly should have been an option considered, if only as a first stepping stone. Given the closeness of the result plus NI border issues it’s probably the only option which could bring some normality back into the UK polity.

    Disingenuous of me to suggest it, because of course, Leave would never have agreed among themselves [or if they did, it would have initiated a permanent campaign of progressive disengagement]. But better to have the internal UK argument before a referendum rather than after Art 50.

  44. TECHNICOLOUROCTOBER

    Leave would never have agreed among themselves [or if they did, it would have initiated a permanent campaign of progressive disengagement]. But better to have the internal UK argument before a referendum rather than after Art 50.

    Put it down to Cameron’s hubris, I suppose, but he could have told the leave campaign that they could take as long as they liked to set the referendum date, but that they must come up with one [preferably two] scenarios of what leaving would mean which could be assessed, along with the remain prospectus by a panel of academics from both sides, with the assessments published at the end of each prospectus.

    That would probably have put the referendum back to late 2019, but would at least have offered the electorate something meaningful.

    Really off now but back later, I hope.

  45. Trevor Warne: Options:
    1/ Give up. Beg to revoke A50 and hope EU are nice to us on the way back.

    2/ Continue as we are. 3rd countries are clearly miffed, as they should be, and EU are very protective so they aren’t going to budge either. This looks like a recipe for ending up in the zombie land of EEA+CU forever, paying 60bn for the pleasure!

    3/ Reset talks asap. Talks with EU move to a ‘min.deal’ up approach and talks with 3rd countries start UK bilateral prelims. Suggested approach is take max UK import quota for last 10years, add 10% and agree that as temporary (5y) new TRQ for UK only side – that is a generous offer to ANZAC, Brazil, US, etc. EU can sort themselves out with default being they take the full TRQ with no UK element – the EU will not like that one bit and hence it is a master card to play before we cave in on everything else.

    4/ Minford plan!

    5/ NOTA

    Brexit is now well into the territory of a failed project, primarily because there is no agreement on objectives.

    [Oh, I hear someone cry, but we voted to leave the EU, is that not an objective? No, that is just saying what we will demolish to make way for our new palace. There is no agreement on what new palace we will build in its place, never mind how we will maintain the essential functions of the palace while the old is replaced with the new.]

    Really, it is now nearly the time to admit that brexit has failed, to say that we have learned a lot and we need to pause for about 4 years [ie withdraw art 50] while we determine what sort of brexit we really want, with a proper prospectus.

    The short term shock will be enormous, less damaging in the long run than carrying on, I think.

  46. @ BZ – for Norway to work in the short-term it would also need to be with THE CU (from a technical perspective I still believe it could be A Customs Understanding with RoO, regulatory shadowing, transition by sector out of CET, etc but HIRETON has convinced me that is v.v.unlikely and EU will not allow it). We then have a serious risk of being ‘lost in transition’ with a permanent EEA+CU outcome and pay 60bn to get that.

    EEA+CU for transition always seemed obvious and that is what May+DD now want but we need to know the final arrangements before we enter transition otherwise we are just kicking the can down the road. Banks, etc will need act on contingency plans. 10,000 jobs, most of with Deutsche planned cull anyway, and EBA/EMA is not a big issue but we’ll have no offsetting increase from reshoring or ability to grow exports if we’re locked into EEA+CU.

    Instead of paying 60bn for a final bad deal I’d prefer to try and reset the talks from min.deal up hoping for a fair deal. Second least bad option being Minford’s plan (the default is the bluff fails). We’d still pay the legal minimum (which is roughly full payment to Mar’19 then 2yr x 10bn – as May offered in Florence) but we’d save 40bn which is legally disputable/political palm greasing and it seems Hammond has dropped the Eeyore routine and politically vital he then spends that 40bn money tree domestically.

    It is a beautiful day and homework shadowing over! Quick walk with the dog before the rugby. I appreciate our more civil conversations but will be a few beers down later so chat tomorrow. Enjoy your day!

  47. Interesting article on bregretters

    https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/nov/25/protest-vote-regret-voting-leave-brexit

    It seems that because of the hugeness of the decision, people are generally hardening in their positions, but those who do change tend to make a very polar switch. Suggestion also that the prompt for a polar switch may be when the final deal is presented, when it becomes clear that there are diverse aspirations for brexit very few of which can be accommodated in any single deal.

  48. Have to dash but for those that haven’t seen the Minford Plan then short read version here:
    https://www.economistsforfreetrade.com/publication/new-model-economy-for-a-post-brexit-britain/

    NB LAB-Leave support this approach! I don’t support the full version but see it as less bad than begging to return or sleep-walking into EEA+CU with a 60bn divorce bill.

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