A quick update on two polls released today. The regular ICM poll for the Guardian has topline voting intentions of CON 43%(nc), LAB 27%(+1), LDEM 8%(nc), UKIP 12%(+1), GRN 5%(-1). Changes are since mid October. Fieldwork was conducted over the weekend, and the full tabs are here.

BMG also released a new poll, though this is actually less recent than the ICM one (fieldwork was done between the 19th and 24th of October, so just over a week ago). Topline figures with changes from September are CON 42%(+3), LAB 28%(nc), LDEM 8%(nc), UKIP 12%(-1), GRN 4%(-1). Full details are here.

Both polls show the Conservatives still holding a large, robust lead. Note also that UKIP support is pretty steady in both – the drop in UKIP support that we saw in MORI’s poll does not appear to have been echoed in anyone else’s data.

707 Responses to “Latest ICM and BMG voting intention”

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  1. CANDY

    I agree that we have now reached such an unpleasant place, both constitutionally and in terms of contrasting views of the population, that the situation can only be resolved by a GE. I can’t see the Supreme Court appeal helping this one way or the other. I think the Govt. should abandon the appeal, go for a GE in January, with Article 50 as a prominent manifesto commitment. If they win, then the new Commons can’t argue and the Lords cannot possibly argue that it is not a manifesto commitment. If they lose, OK, the voters didn’t meant it on June 23rd.

    BTW If you read the 2015 Tory Manifesto pushing an Article 50 bill through the Lords as a Manifesto Commitment would be entirely proper.

  2. @Rodger

    If I misunderstood your comment that at least one of the judges had a conflict of interest that should have precluded them sitting in judgement then I apologize.

    You do understand that for a judge with a conflict of interest not to recuse themself from case would be corrupt, right?

    It may be that you meant conflict of interest in a more vague way (member of the liberal metropolitan elite sort of thing) but I took it at face value.

  3. If there is an early election, say in March 2017 how would this work with the FTPA? Is the next GE after that in March 2022 or in May 2021?

    If so, aren’t we going to tread on the toes of the Scottish parliament yet again?

  4. NEIL A

    One of the Judges has built a major part of his career around the integration of European law. Brexit would render all that work somewhat irrelevant. Most people would call that a conflict of interest in that he had a strong personal reason for wanting to see Brexit stopped. Wikipedia says “A conflict of interest (COI) is a situation in which a person or organization is involved in multiple interests, financial or otherwise, one of which could possibly corrupt the motivation or decision-making of that individual or organization”. It was a conflict of interest.

    Would this have affected his decision? Frankly I very much doubt it. Should he have recused himself? Well, was there an alternative as well qualified who was not at a similar disadvantage? I don’t know.

    But they haven’t addressed the question. They have left themselves open to perfectly reasonable doubts, which they have not answered. That is how public servants, be they judges, police officers, teachers or whoever, are brought into disrepute.

  5. ALAN

    Under the FTPA, if the HoC passes a motion that “This House has no confidence in Her Majesty’s Government” and then does not with 14 days pass a motion “This House has confidence in Her Majesty’s Government”, then there is an election.

    I think the first one would pass, and everyone would go home for a fortnight.

  6. So, the “temporary” honeymoon period goes on eh? Bloody voters! If only they would listen?

  7. RE: Judicial conflict of interest

    The test that is applied is set out here

    Ansar v Lloyds TSB Bank Plc & Ors [2006] EWCA Civ 1462 (09 October 2006)

    The Court of Appeal approved this description by Mr Justice Burton in the EAT.

    “l. The test to be applied as stated by Lord Hope in Porter v Magill 620021 2 AC 357, at para 103 and recited by Pill LJ in Lodwick v London Borough of Southwark at para 18 in determining bias is: whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the Tribunal was biased.

    “2. If an objection of bias is then made, it will be the duty of the Chairman to consider the objection and exercise his judgment upon it. He would be as wrong to yield to a tenuous or frivolous objection as he would to ignore an objection of substance: Locabail at para 21.

    “3. Although it is important that justice must be seen to be done, it is equally important that judicial officers discharge their duty to sit and do not, by acceding too readily to suggestions of appearance of bias, encourage parties to believe that by seeking the disqualification of a judge, they will have their case tried by someone thought to be more likely to decide the case in their favour: Re JRL ex parte CJL [l9861] 161 CLR 342 at 352, per Mason J, High Court of Australia recited in Locabail at para 22.

    “4. It is the duty of a judicial officer to hear and determine the cases allocated to him or her by their head of jurisdiction. Subject to certain limited exceptions, a judge should not accede to an unfounded disqualification application: Clenae Ptv Ud v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [l9991] VSCA 35 recited in Locabail at para 24.

    “5. The EAT should test the Employment Tribunal’s decision as to recusal and also consider the proceedings before the Tribunal as a whole and decide whether a perception of bias had arisen: Pill LJ in Lodwick, at para 18.

    “6. The mere fact that a judge, earlier in the same case or in a previous case, had commented adversely on a party or witness, or found the evidence of a party or witness to be unreliable, would not without something more found a sustainable objection: Locabail at para 25.

    “7. Parties cannot assume or expect that findings adverse to a party in one case entitle that party to a different judge or tribunal in a later case. Something more must be shown: Pill LJ in Lodwick above, at para 21, recited by Cox J in Breeze Benton Solicitors (A Partnership) v Weddell UKEAT/0873/03 at para 41.

    “8. Courts and tribunals need to have broad backs, especially in a time when some litigants and their representatives are well aware that to provoke actual or ostensible bias against themselves can achieve what an application for adjournment (or stay) cannot: Sedley LJ in Bennett at para 19.

    “9. There should be no underestimation of the value, both in the formal English judicial system as well as in the more informal Employment Tribunal hearings, of the dialogue which frequently takes place between the judge or Tribunal and a party or representative. No doubt should be cast on the right of the Tribunal, as master of its own procedure, to seek to control prolixity and irrelevancies: Peter Gibson J in Peter Simpler & CO Ltd v Cooke [l986] IRLR 19 EAT at para 17.

    “10. In any case where there is real ground for doubt, that doubt should be resolved in favour of recusal: Locabail at para 25.

    “11. Whilst recognising that each case must be carefully considered on its own facts, a real danger of bias might well be thought to arise (Locabail at para 25) if:

    “a. there were personal friendship or animosity between the judge and any member of the public involved in the case; or

    “b. the judge were closely acquainted with any member of the public involved in the case, particularly if the credibility of that individual could be significant in the decision of the case; or,

    “c. in a case where the credibility of any individual were an issue to be decided by the judge, the judge had in a previous case rejected the evidence of that person in such outspoken terms as to throw doubt on his ability to approach such person’s evidence with an open mind on any later occasion; or,

    “d. on any question at issue in the proceedings before him the judge had expressed views, particularly in the course of the hearing, in such extreme and unbalanced terms as to throw doubt on their ability to try the issue with an objective judicial mind; or,

    “e. for any other reason, there were real grounds for doubting the ability of the judge to ignore extraneous considerations, prejudices and predilections and bring an objective judgment to bear on the issues.”

    It must be noted that a judicial officer has a duty NOT to recuse himself unless the reasonable and objective person sitting at the back of the court and with knowledge of all the relevant circumstances would consider a REAL as opposed to fanciful possibility of bias. In this case the legal decision was not about leaving the EU but as to which institution has lawful power so to do, I fail to see the argument that this reveals a real risk of bias given the issue to be decided.

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