It is often assumed by the media – and hence this influences the public to believe it true – that in order to win an election Party A must persuade x supporters of Party B to switch their vote or vice versa.

Actually, this is erroneous. Yes, a certain amount of persuasion is required, but the persuading is directed primarily at the following groups in order of importance:

1. People who voted for Party A last time – to ensure that they do so again;
2. People who have usually voted for Party A in the past, but did not vote at all last time – to persuade them to vote this time;
3. People who have generally voted for Party A in the past, but voted differently last time – to persuade them to “come home”;
4. People who have never voted in the past, mainly young first-time voters, but this includes an increasing number of older people who have never been “engaged” – to entice them to vote Party A;

and only then

5 People who have never voted for Party A in the past – but may be persuaded to change the habit of a life-time thanks to disappointment / disillusion with their party of choice. Note that this only really works against the governing party, but can be used against minor parties in the context of “tactical voting”.

Only in cases 3 and 5 is any attempt being made to change how an individual votes compared to last time.

Remember that in order to “win” an election Party A needs to have more votes than Party B. It does not matter if the seat is won by a majority of 1 on a turnout of 20% or a majority of 20,000 on a turnout of 80%.

So, in order to win, Party A will concentrate its efforts on getting as many people in groups 1 and 2 to vote, hope for some votes from groups 3-5, and most especially, hope that Party B fails to succeed in relation to its own groups 1 and 2.

What Party A cannot do is overtly persuade supporters of Party B to stay at home, though this may be the outcome of trying to achieve 3 or 5. It it does, it is nevertheless beneficial to Party A.

This whole scenario produces what is known as “differential turnout”, and is actually by far the largest factor in producing winners and losers in individual seats – especially as 1 and 2 above require resources on the ground for their success.

In most cases, this will be a contest between Parties A and B. In some cases it may become a contest between parties A, B and C. For parties D E or F to get in on the act, they have the distinct disadvantage of fishing only in the pool of voters under 4 and 5, and so need parties A, B C to be singularly unsuccessful in their efforts in order to pull off a surprise win.

In 2001 and 2005, turnout was only +/- 60%. This means that the pool of voters in 4 is growing, while an increasing number of voters have been in group 2 for more than one election. That is the main factor which will enable “others” to increase their share of total vote at the next GE – but it is still unlikely to deliver more than a handful of seats.

Niche parties may well find buyers for their particular brand, but the problem with a niche offering is that it is too narrowly focussed to attract sufficiently wide support.

The main parties sussed this years ago, hence they are fairly broad in their product offering. It may be that they are suffering a bit at the moment as the competition hots up a bit, but, just as on the supermarket shelf, expect the big brands to fight back and either see off the minor brands, or – as often happens, arrange a “merger” or acquisition.

To return to you branding metaphor:

Not so much: Ovaltine, Pears Soap and Vimto. More Heinz, Birds Eye and Kraft. Or even perhaps: Tesco, Sainsbury and Asda.

It’s nice to see there’s at least one unreconstructed Marxist still around!

I’d love to see how your newly created industries creating 2m jobs at the behest of the government (without any apparent market demand for their products so far as I can tell) are going to generate the “profits” you refer to!!